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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Enforcement Procedure of Oberlin, Ohio, Fair 
Housing Ordinance Held Unconstitutional-
Porter v. City of Oberlin* 
Plaintiff, a citizen of Oberlin, Ohio, brought an action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief to review the constitutionality of 
the city's fair housing ordinance, which makes it a misdemeanor 
to discriminate because of race, creed, or color in the sale or rental 
of housing. Under the procedure established by the ordinance,1 the 
Housing Renewal Commission is directed to make investigations 
of complaints filed with it. If violations are discovered, the com-
mission must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practices by 
conciliation and persuasion. If these efforts fail, the entire record 
of the matter must be forwarded to the city council, accompanied 
by the commission's recommendations. The city council may either 
dismiss the complaint or refer it to the city solicitor for criminal 
proceedings. The Common Pleas Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the entire ordinance.2 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
held, reversed as to the section on enforcement, three judges dis-
senting; othenvise affirmed. The enforcement procedure outlined 
by the ordinance is an attempt by a municipality to establish adjudi-
cative remedies in contravention of the Ohio Constitution,8 and 
• 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). 
I. OBERLIN, OHIO, ORDINANCE 235 AC CMS (1961): 
"Section 3. ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE 
(a) A complaint charging a violation of any provision of the prohibitive sec• 
tions of this ordinance may be made by an aggrieved individual or his legal coun-
sel. Such complaint shall be made in writing to the Housing Renewal Commission 
and shall give full details of the complaint and be sworn to under oath. 
(b) The Commission shall make a prompt and full investigation of each com-
plaint of the unlawful housing practice. 
(c) If after such investigation the Commission by an affirmative concurrence 
of three-fifths of the members thereto determines that a violation of this ordinance 
has occurred, it shall attempt to eliminate the unlawful housing practice by con-
ciliation and persuasion. 
(d) In the event the Commission fails in the conciliation proceedings, it shall 
forward all papers including the complaint, investigation, record of conciliation 
proceedings, factual findings and recommendation to the City Council. 
(e) The complaint, investigation and conciliation proceedings shall be con• 
fidential; records and proceedings of the Commission shall not be made public 
until same are forwarded to the City Council. 
(f) The City Council shall review the proceedings and shall either dismiss the 
complaint or refer same to the City Solicitor for appropriate legal action under 
this ordinance." 
2. See principal case at 143, 205 N.E.2d at 363. 
3. Omo CONST. art. IV, § 1: "The judicial power of the state is vested in [certain 
named courts] ••• , and such other courts inferior to the courts of appeals as may 
from time to time be established by law." 
[710] 
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is also invalid as lacking sufficient definiteness anq. certainty to be 
enforceable. 
Municipal, state, and federal statutes providing relief through 
administrative machinery based on a process of conference, concili-
ation, and persuasion have proved most effective in implementing 
public policy against discrimination by private persons on the basis 
of race, color or religion.4 Administrative agencies with enforcement 
power have dealt with discrimination in public accommodations, 
housing, employment, and education.5 Under typical conciliation-
oriented enforcement procedures,6 the agency, upon receiving a 
complaint, makes an investigation, and, if there is probable cause 
to believe that the allegations of the complaint are true, attempts 
to eliminate the discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation, 
and persuasion. If conciliation is unsuccessful, some more direct 
type of enforcement procedure is provided. At the state level, there 
are a number of human relation commissions without jurisdiction 
over housing. Although they are usually empowered to issue cease-
and-desist orders enforceable by the courts, all lack powers of crim-
inal enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Of those states with 
a human relations commission having jurisdiction over housing, 
only Alaska provides for a criminal prosecution to enforce its anti-
discrimination law.7 On the other hand, criminal enforcement tech-
Omo CoNsr. art. IV, § 19: "The general assembly may establish courts of concilia-
tion and prescribe their powers and duties." 
Jurisdiction of criminal proceedings is vested in the Municipal Courts of Ohio. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2931.041 (Baldwin 1964) reads in part: "Municipal Courts have 
jurisdiction in criminal cases to finally try and determine prosecutions for the violation 
of municipal ordinances within the corporate limits of municipal corporations and 
misdemeanor qises within their territories as provided in ch. 1901 of the Revised Code." 
4. The desirability of this process is twofold: the alleged violator is given an op-
portunity to comply voluntarily with the law without the stigma of prosecution, and 
the general welfare of the community is promoted by ensuring equality of opportunity 
to all segments of the population. See Bamberger 8: Lewin, The Right to Equal Treat• 
ment: Administrative Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74: HARV. L. REv. 
526 (1961); Carter, Policies and Practices of Discrimination Commissions, 304 Annals 
62, 67-68 (1956). . 
5. See Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for 
a Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1180 (1965). For a list of 
state and local human relation commissions and their jurisdictions, see id. at 1239-44. 
6. For discussions of typical enforcement procedures, see id. at 1180-87; Bamberger 
8: Lewin, supra note 4, at 526-55; Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 524-25 (1959). 
7. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.61.230, .240 (1962), §§ 18.80.010-.160 (Supp. 1963). Sixteen 
states have laws governing private housing: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Of these, only Maine and 
New Hampshire lack official enforcement agencies. There is a wide variety of enforce-
ment practices. Center for Fair Housing, Nat'! Comm. Against Discrimination in Hous-
ing, The Fair Housing Statutes and Ordinances as of June 1, 1965 Gune 25, 1965) (a 
report on state and local legislative and administrative action related to achieving 
equality of opportunity in housing). 
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niques have been prevalent at the municipal level.8 If conciliation 
fails, several city commissions lacking housing jurisdiction,0 as well 
as the majority of those commissions specifically established by fair 
housing ordinances,10 forward their findings directly to the city 
attorney, who can then institute a criminal action. 
In contrast to this general statutory scheme of agency-enforced 
conciliation backed by criminal enforcement, the enforcement pro-
cedure of the Oberlin Fair Housing Ordinance provides for screen-
ing and review of the Housing Renewal Commission's findings by 
the city council.11 In effect, both the commission and the city 
council are afforded an opportunity to dismiss the complaint be-
fore the city attorney acquires the power to invoke criminal en-
forcement. In invalidating the enforcement section of the Oberlin 
Ordinance, the majority of the court in the principal case empha-
8. One of the major reason~ that cities entering the field of antidiscrimination gen• 
erally established the criminal enforcement technique rather than the administrative 
technique (cease-and-desist orders) employed by the states was that cities viewed their 
regulatory power as limited to that expressly granted by the state through home-rule 
laws. Municipal ordinances are passed under the constitutional authority giving muni• 
cipalities the power to adopt such local police requirements as are not in conflict with 
the general law. For a discussion of the power of a municipal corporation to enact civil 
rights legislation, see Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1964). 
9. For examples of ordinances establishing municipal commissions with jurisdiction 
over employment, see, e.g., 28 L.R.R.M. 3087 (1952) (Minneapolis, Minn., Mayor's Com-
mission on Human Relations); 27 L.R.R.M. 3039 (1951) (Youngstown, Ohio, Fair Em• 
ployment Practices Commission). See also Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1163 (1958). 
For examples of ordinances establishing municipal commissions with jurisdiction 
over public accommodations, see 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1897 (1964) (Corpus Christi, 
Texas, Human Relations Committee); 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1684 (1963) (Kansas City, 
Mo., Commission on Human Relations; ordinance upheld, Marshall v. Kansas City, 
355 S.W .2d 877 (Mo. 1962)); 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 248 (1960) (same). Examples of the 
kinds of fair employment practice statutes are presented in Fair Employment Practice 
Legislation in the U.S.: Federal, State and Municipal, Public Affairs Bulletin, No. 93, 
Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service (1951). For analyses of pre-1951 
ordinances, see Rice & Greenberg, Municipal Protection of Human Rights, 1952 Wis. 
L. REv. 679. See also 2 EMERSON & HABER, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN nu: UNITED 
STATES 1451-58 (2d ed. 1958); Note, 56 YALE L.J. 431 (1947). 
10. EAsT ST. LOUIS, ILL., ORDINANCE 3913 (1964); WICHITA, KAN., ORDINANCE 27-550 
(1964); ANN ARBOR, MICFf., ORDINANCE CODE ch. 112, §§ 9.151-.160 (1963); DETROIT, MICH,, 
ORDINANCE 753-F (1962); GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., ORDINANCE 1628 (1963); DULUTH, MINN., 
ORDINANCE 7260 (1963); ST. LOUIS, Mo., REv!SED CODE ch. 395 (1960); ALBUQUERQUE, 
N.M., ORDINANCE 2358 (1963); OBERLIN, Omo, ORDINANCE 235 AC CMS (1961); TOLEDO, 
Omo, MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 3-41-15 to -18 (1961); ERIE, PA., ORDINANCE 19-1963 (1963); 
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE tit. 9, §§ 9-1101 to •1109 (1963); PITISBURGH, PA., ORDINANCE 
523 (1958); MADISON, WIS., GENERAL ORDINANCES § 3.23 (1963). 
11. See note 1 supra. Only one other city fair housing ordinance employing criminal 
sanctions for violation of the act involves council review of a commission's proceedings 
before prosecution is commenced. See YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 
72, pt. 5 (1963). The Yellow Springs ordinance docs not require the commission to com• 
municate its findings to the council before prosecution is commenced. The New Lon• 
don, Connecticut, ordinance provides that the Fair Housing Practices Board must 
communicate its findings of probable cause to the State Civil Rights Commission and 
the City Council. No other sanctions are provided. New London, Conn., Ordinance 
Establishing a Fair Housing Practices :Board (July 15, 1963). 
February 1966] Recent Developments 713 
sized that no criteria were established to determine when concilia-
tion by the commission had been successful, or to prescribe the 
grounds for dismissal of a complaint by the council, that the section 
was too indefinite to be enforceable, and that the city council had 
both improperly assumed judicial power itself and improperly dele-
gated such power to the commission.12 
Given a restrictive interpretation, the court's opinion would not 
seem to have great impact upon the validity of agency-enforced 
civil rights legislation. Although the ordinance allows for the dis-
missal of a complaint by either the commission or the city council, 
the court's language is ambiguous as to whether the fatal lack of 
definite standards pertains to the screening by the commission, the 
council, or both. If the court's reference was to the lack of standards 
set for the council, the impact of the Porter decision would be 
limited to the Oberlin ordinance, which is unique in allowing the 
city council complete discretion to decide whether a criminal prose-
cution is to be brought.18 
However, if the decision were construed to require definite 
statutory standards for the process of conciliation and persuasion by 
the commission, it would cast doubt upon the validity of most fair 
housing laws, as well as other agency-enforced civil rights legislation 
which uses this process. Although no state or local act prohibiting 
discrimination in employment has been found which establishes 
definite standards to govern the conciliation process, 14 such laws 
authorizing the establishment of commissions with far greater. en-
forcement powers than those conferred on the Oberlin Housing 
Renewal Commission have been upheld.15 Public accommodation 
12. "No procedure .•• is set forth nor are any criteria established to determine 
the success of conciliation by the commission or to prescribe the grounds for the dis-
missal of a complaint by council ..•• [T]he only reasonable conclusion which may be 
derived from the provisions of section 3 of the ordinance is that if conciliation by the 
commission is successful, or if the council dismisses the complaint, then prosecution of 
the complaint shall thereby terminate .••• [S]uch termination of an alleged violation 
would appear to be, in legal effect, the acquittal of a crime and would constitute the 
exercise of judicial power which council had no authority to bestow upon the com-
mission or to enact unto itself. .•. Moreover .•• it lacks sufficient definiteness and 
certainty to be enforceable." Principal case at 155. 
13. "Discretion must be made subject to a standard or rule to operate uniformly. 
• • • An ordinance can not commit to the municipal legislative body itself, any more 
than to administrative officials, uncontrolled discretion." 9 McQmLIJN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS 531-32 (3d rev. ed. 1964). 
14. See 2 EMERSON & HABER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1451-83. Witherspoon, supra 
note 5, at 1239-44, lists the state and local human relations commissions and the rele-
vant fair employment practice statutes. See generally Morgan, An Analysis of State 
FEPC Legislation, 8 LAB L.J. 469 (1957); Rice & Greenberg, Munidpal Protection of 
Human Rights, 1952 WIS. L. REv. 679, 692. 
15. E.g., Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954); Castle Hill Beach 
Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 622, 144 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1955), afj'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 
950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367, motion for reargument denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 664, 153 N.Y.S.2d 
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laws with similar enforcement procedures providing for informal 
conference, conciliation, and persuasion have also been adopted 
without specific standards in several states.16 Also, city public accom-
modation acts with the same enforcement procedure found in 
"conventional"17 fair housing laws have been declared constitu-
tional.18 The requirement of specific statutory standards for the 
conciliation process inherent in a broad reading of the decision in 
the principal case would even invalidate section 706(a) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which authorizes "informal methods of confer-
ence, conciliation and persuasion."19 Moreover, an examination of 
state and city fair housing laws fails to reveal a single instance in 
which the legislature considered it necessary to define the criteria 
for successful conciliation.20 
544 (1st Dep't 1956); Ross v. Arbury, 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 
285 App. Div. 886, 139 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st Dep't 1954). 
16. In none of these laws has the process by which conciliation is to be achieved 
been rigidly defined. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 5 (1965). Public accom-
modation statutes are compiled in 1 Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Com• 
merce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1316-80 (1963). See generally 2 EMERSON &: HADER, op, cit. 
supra note 9, at 1405-22. 
17. The "conventional" ordinance, unlike the Oberlin law, establishes a two-tiered 
enforcement procedure. It creates an administrative agency which may receive com-
plaints, investigate, attempt conciliation, and hold hearings; it may then forward its 
recommendations or findings of fact to the city prosecutor or municipal court. See 
notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text. 
18. E.g., Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962). 
19. 78 Stat. 259 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964): "If the Commission shall deter-
mine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge 
is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice, by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." 
20. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.010-.160 (Supp. 1965); CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY 
CODE §§ 35700-38; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 69-7-1 to -7 (1963), as amended, Colo. 
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 185, §§ 69-7-3 to -7; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 53-34 to -36 (1958), 
as amended, §§ 53-35 to -36 (Supp. 1965), §§ 31-122 to -128 (1958), as amended, § 31-128 
(Supp. 1964); IND. ANN. STAT.§ 48-8543(b) (1963), §§ 40-2307 to -2317 (1964), as amended, 
§§ 40-2308, 40-2312 (Supp. 1965); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1965), ch. 6, 
§ 56 (Supp. 1964); MICH. CoNST. art. I, § 2, art. V, § 29; MICH. STAT, ANN, § 3.548 (Supp. 
1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.481 (1963) (urban renewal housing); §§ 363.01-.13 (1963), 
as amended, §§ 363.01-.09, .12-.13 (Supp. 1964), § 507.18 (Supp. 1964); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 354-A:l-:14 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-1 to -28 (1964) (attorney general 
empowered to investigate and conciliate); N.Y. ExECUTIVE I.Aw §§ 290-301; OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. ·§§ 4II2.0l-.o7 (Baldwin Supp. 1965); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 183.310-.510, 
659.010-.ll5, 659.990, 696.300 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-62 (1964); R,I. GEN, 
LAws ANN. §§ 11-24-1 to -4 (1956), §§ 28-5-8 to -36 (1956), as amended, § 28-5-11 (Supp, 
1965); WASH. REv. CODE § 35.8I.170 (Supp. 1963) (publicly assisted housing-held un-
constitutional in O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 
2d 793, 365 P.2d I (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962); New Haven, Conn., Equal 
Opportunities Ordinance (May 14, 1964); New London, Conn., Ordinance Establishing 
a Fair Housing Practices Board CTuly 15, 1963); WASHINGTON, D.C., PouCE REGULA· 
TIONS art. 45, §§ 1-13; Chicago, Ill., Fair Housing Ordinance (Sept. II, 1963); EAST ST, 
Lours, ILL., ORDINANCE 3913 (1964); PEORIA, ILL., MUNICIPAL CoDE app. D (1963); 
WICHITA, KAN., ORDINANCE 27-550 (1964); ANN ARBOR, MICH., ORDINANCE CODE ch, ll2, 
§§ 9.151-.160 (In City of Ann Arbor v. Hubble (Washtenaw County Circuit Court, 
June 8, 1965, unreported) the court, relying on the principal case, held that the sections 
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The various state and local legislative bodies seem to have recog-
nized that without flexibility and freedom to mold conciliatory pat-
terns to fit local conditions, there can be little hope of providing 
effective responses to the many problems of discrimination. The 
great value of antidiscrimination agencies is that they make respon-
dents more amenable to persuasion. For example, in the fair housing 
area the conciliation process is used (1) to educate the respondent 
and persuade him to pay at least lip service to the law; (2) to try to 
persuade the respondent to offer the aggrieved party the housing 
unit sought or the next available one; and (3) to try to persuade 
the respondent to change his pattern of doing business to one more 
favorable to Negro applicants. Destruction of the vast number of 
civil rights laws by a holding such as that in the principal case 
would promote no social good because the broad educative effect 
of the conciliation process would be lost. Therefore, it is hoped that 
Porter will be limited to the special statutory formula of the Oberlin 
ordinance-commission review combined with council review, re-
quiring definite standards for determining both successful con-
ciliation and grounds for the dismissal of a complaint. 
The second basis on which the court in the principal case invali-
dated the ordinance was that the procedure amounted to an im-
proper delegation of judicial power in violation of the Ohio con-
stitution,21 which vests judicial power in courts established by the 
General Assembly.22 It is clear that an administrative agency has 
no power to determine the guilt or innocence of an individual in 
granting investigative and conciliatory power to the commission were unconstitutionally 
ambiguous); DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE 753-F (1962); GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., ORDINANCE 
1628 (1963); DULUTH, MINN., ORDINANCE 7260 (1963); KANSAS CITY, Mo., REv. ORDI-
NANCES § 39.585 (1962); ST. LOUIS, Mo., REVISED CODE cb. 395 (1960); ALBUQUERQUE, 
N.M., ORDINANCE 2358 (1963); :BUFFALO, N.Y., ORDINANCES, ch. VII, art. XVIII, §§ 350-53 
(1964); NEW YoRK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE cb. 41, tit. X (1957), as amended, (1962); 
SCHENECTADY, N.Y., ORDINANCES 14353 (1963); OBERLIN, OHIO, ORDINANCE 235 AC CMS 
(1961); SHAKER HEIGHTS, Omo, CODIFIBD ORDINANCES §§ 704.01-02 (1961); TOLEDO, Omo, 
MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-41-15 to -18 (1961); YELLOW SPRINGS, Omo, CODIFIBD ORDINANCES 
cb. 72, pt. 5 (1963); ERIE, PA., ORDINANCE 19-1963 (1963); PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE tit. 9, 
§§ 9-1101 to -1109 (1963); PrITSBURGH, PA., ORDINANCE 523 (1958); :BELOIT, WIS., GENERAL 
ORDINANCES CODE § 8.119 (1964); MADISON, WIS., GENERAL ORDINANCES § 3.23 (1963). See 
generally 9 TRENDS IN HOUSING I (July-Aug. 1965). 
Other cities with fair housing ordinances for which citations were unavailable in-
clude: San Francisco, Cal.; Gary, Ind. (effective June 4, 1965); Indianapolis, Ind. (en-
acted July 1964); Des Moines, Iowa (effective June 4, 1964); Iowa City, Iowa; St. Paul, 
Minn. (enacted August 13, 1964); South Euclid, Ohio; Warrensville Heights, Ohio; Oak 
Ridge, Tenn.; King County, Wash. (effective March 3, 1964). The Fair Housing Statutes 
and Ordinances, supra note 7, at 6-7; Enclosure in a letter from A. H. Zwerner, Asso-
ciate General Counsel, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Sept. 9, 1965 (copy on 
file in the offices of the Michigan Law Review). A compilation of many state and city 
fair housing provisions may be found in HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, FAIR. 
HOUSING LAws (1964). 
21. See note 12 supra. 
22. See note 3 supra. 
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criminal cases.28 According to Porter, if conciliation by the commis-
sion is successful, or if the council dismisses the complaint, prose-
cution of the violation must terminate. Such termination, in legal 
effect, would amount to an acquittal of a crime and thus would be 
an improper delegation of judicial power from the council to the 
commission or an improper assumption of judicial power by the 
council.24 
A strict interpretation of the precise language of the Oberlin 
ordinance would seem to support the decision of the court in the 
principal case. It is si~ificant that the ordinance provides that 
compla_ints "shall" be made to the commission and, if conciliation 
fails, "shall" be fonvarded to the city council.25 In view of this 
mandatory language, it would appear that the city council consid-
ered its review function an essential part of the operation of the 
enforcement procedure.26 While it might be argued that the ag-
grieved individual could avoid the commission investigation and 
council review by complaining directly to the city solicitor, who 
would then institute a criminal action, it seems doubtful that the 
city council, in enacting an ordinance providing for council review 
of citizens' complaints, intended to create any means by which its 
function could be curtailed by direct complaint to the city solicitor. 
Under this view there is only one available procedure for redress 
of grievances, and a dismissal of a complaint by either the com-
mission or the council would appear to be tantamount to a final 
adjudicative dismissal of the case. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the mere establishment 
of a commission to handle complaints does not necessarily indicate 
an abrogation of the right of an aggrieved individual to seek relief 
through direct complaint to the city solicitor.27 Indeed, it would 
23. "One kind of adjudication which clearly can not be conferred upon an adminis• 
trative agency is the power to determine guilt or innocence in criminal cases • • • [be 
cause) the criminal defendant is entitled to special procedural protection of the kind 
that is given neither in civil proceedings in court nor in administrative proceedings," 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 47 (1959). 
24. See note 12 supra. 
25. See note 1 supra. 
26. OBERLIN, Omo, ORDINANCE 235 AC CMS, § 3(a) (1961). The meanings of "shall" 
and "may" are naturally of great importance in the proper interpretation of any statute. 
The use of the word "shall" indicates a mandatory intent unless the context indicates 
otherwise. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUGnON § 262 (1940); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY 
CoNSTRUGnON § 2803 (Supp. 1964). 
27. This argument was rejected in City of Ann Arbor v. Hubble (Washtenaw County 
Circuit Court, July 30, 1965, unreported). The city contended that, while the provision 
of the city ordinance creating jurisdiction in the municipal court may "confer an 
absolute right in all aggrieved persons due to alleged violation of a city ordinance to 
go directly to a municipal judge and upon proper showing have a warrant issued, that 
right does not seem to be abrogated by the Ann Arbor ordinance just because it fails 
to explicitly state that right." Brief for City, p. 6. It is submitted that the court was 
wrong in its reliance upon the principal case, see note 31 infra, since it failed to recog• 
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appear that section 3 of the Oberlin ordinance does not necessarily 
provide for only one avenue of redress. While state law provides 
that jurisdiction in criminal cases rests solely with the municipal 
court,28 it is apparent that the administrative screening- process 
established by the ordinance pertains only to the handling of com-
plaints that may be brought to the court by the city.29 There is no 
express, or implied indication that redress is to be obtained only by 
complaint to the commission, although the language does suggest 
that at least one copy of every complaint must be filed with the 
commission. If the city council . had intended that complaints be 
filed only with the commission, it would seem that express language 
would have so indicated. 
If the Oberlin ordinance is read, as it was in the principal case, 
to preclude direct access by aggrieved individuals to the city attor-
ney, it is important that the ordinance be distinguished from the 
more conventional statute, which is framed in more permissive 
terms and is subject to broader interpretation. The more conven-
tional type of antidiscrimination law provides for criminal prosecu-
tion as a misdemeanor in case of violation, unrestricted by any type 
of council review.80 The language of such ordinances pertaining to 
the initial filing of a complaint is crucial. A common provision 
states that "any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged un-
lawful discriminatory practice may by himself or his attoi:ney file 
with the commission a complaint in writing under oath."81 Such 
permissive language would seem to suggest that the commission is 
intended to be merely one of several possible avenues of redress.82 
Interpreting these conventional ordinances as requiring use of the 
nize the clear distinction between the "mandatory" ordinance involved in Porter and 
the "permissive" Ann Arbor ordinance. 
28. See note 3 supra. 
29. See note l supra, § 3(a). 
30. See note 10 supra. 
31. (Emphasis added.) E.g., WASH. R.Ev. CODE § 49.60.230(1) (1961) (public accom-
modations); ERIE, PA., ORDINANCE 19-1963 (1963) (housing). 
32. But see City of Ann Arbor v. Hubble (Washtenaw County Circuit Court, July 
30, 1965, unreported), which involved a "conventional" fair housing ordinance (ANN 
.ARBOR, MICH., ORDINANCE CODE ch. 112, §§ 9.151-.160 (1963)), and in which the issue 
of improper delegation of judicial authority was considered. Breakey, J., followed Porter 
and declared § 9.157, l[lf 3-5, unconstitutional insofar as those paragraphs purport "to 
invade either the jurisdiction of the duly-constituted law enforcement officers or the 
functioning of the judiciary." Order remanding case to Ann Arbor Municipal Court, 
p. 2 Guly 30, 1965). The Ann Arbor City Charter vests sole jurisdiction in crintlnal 
cases with the Municipal Court. ANN .ARBOR, MICH., CITY CHARTER § 6.8(a) (1963). See 
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1192-.1195 (Supp. 1963). 
One interpretation which would definitely seem to be precluded is that an individ-
ual may seek enforcement only through the city attorney, despite the fact th!lt city 
charters often vest sole jurisdiction in criminal cases with the Municipal Court. E.g., 
ANN .ARBOR, MICH., CITY CHARTER § 6.8(a) (1963). Such a construction would defeat the 
very purpose of creating the commission, since enforcement by an administrative agency 
is based on obtaining compliance through conciliation rather than prosecution. 
718 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 64 
commission as the only avenue of redress33 would frustrate the inten-
tion of legislatures to give an aggrieved individual an added remedy 
rather than replace his existing remedies with a single new one. 
Furthermore, if this interpretation were adopted, the language in 
Porter, construed broadly, would suggest that other courts might 
invalidate similar enforcement procedures in other antidiscrimi-
nation legislation which has been in successful, unquestioned oper-
ation. Abrogation of this established practice of conciliation by 
local commissions familiar with local problems34 would shift the 
task of alleviating discriminatory practices in many areas to state 
civil rights commissions. This would be advantageous in the sense 
that it would consolidate statewide enforcement powers and policies 
without duplicating administrative effort, but such a bar on legis-
lative and administrative screening could logically extend to state 
antidiscrimination commissions, which have even greater powers 
of enforcement than local commissions.85 
The fact that the "conventional" ordinance provides that an 
individual may file a complaint with the commission does not pre-
clude a simultaneous filing of a complaint with the city attorney. 
Construing the language in this manner would theoretically enable 
the city attorney to proceed with prosecution at the same time con-
ciliation was being attempted. While this result is perhaps neither 
desirable nor likely,86 the power of bringing complaints to the city 
33. See, e.g., Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 622, 144 N.Y.S.2d 747 
(Sup. Ct, 1955). But see Vaught v. Village Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 7 RACE REL. L, 
REP. 849 (Super. Ct. Fairfield County, Conn. 1962), in which the court said that 
failure to invoke the aid of the Civil Rights Commission was not a bar to the 
maintenance of the action simply because the statute (CONN, GEN, STAT, REv. § 53,36 
(Supp. 1963)) gave the commission the power to entertain a complaint, The court 
emphasized that "an administrative remedy which does not give to the complainant 
a right to have a judicial review of an administrative order dismissing his com-
plaint, does not afford to him a full and adequate remedy at law." Id, at 851, Sec 
also People v. Carr, 231 Mich. 246, 203 N.W. 948 (1925) (a public utilities com• 
mission held not to be the exclusive remedial process provided for by a statute, 
despite language so indicating); Backrack v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 41 Misc, 2d 512, 245 
N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (procedures before the Commission on Human Rights 
not necessarily exclusive). 
34. See McGee &: Ginser, The House I Live In: A Study of Housing for Minority, 
46 CORNELL L.Q. 194, 227 (1961); Witherspoon, supra note 5. 
35. This argument must be viewed in light of the fact that provisions for court-en• 
forceable cease-and-desist orders are rare in city fair housing ordinances. State com-
missions, on the other hand, exercise greater powers because of the generally greater 
powers enjoyed by a state. See note 8 supra. 
36. See Bamberger &: Lewin, supra note 4, at 573: "In many states where both civil 
and administrative procedures are available, a complainant is required to elect bis 
remedy. Such a requirement is supported by the fact that the pendency of a suit during 
conciliation may exert considerable pressure on the respondent and make it difficult 
for him to agree in good faith. Moreover, if the commission is unable to assure the 
respondent that conciliation will bar later court action, its persuasiveness may be sub-
stantially undermined ••• ," See WASH. REv. ConE § 49.60.020 (Supp. 1965), which 
requires that an antidiscrimination commission refuse a complaint on which a civil 
action bas already been commenced. 
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attorney, in practical terms, adds the threat of court enforcement 
to the commission's investigations.87 Under the usual housing ordi-
nance,88 it is apparent that the city attorney has the power to deter-
mine whether a misdemeanor proceeding shall be instituted. If 
access to the courts is available to both the commission and the 
city attorney, termination of the alleged violation by successful con-
ciliation or a finding of lack of probable cause does not constitute 
the acquittal of a crime, any more than does a finding of no prob-
able cause in a preliminary examination before a commissioner in 
other kinds of criminal cases. No formal exercise of judicial power 
has taken place, for no legal prosecution has been instituted. Thus, 
whatever transpires before the city attorney's decision· to prosecute 
has been purely administrative and is not binding upon him. This 
would seem to have been recognized in cases upholding the consti-
tutionality of state39 and local40 fair housing laws with "conven-
tional" enforcement procedures. 
37. Bamberger&: Lewin, supra note 4, at 530. 
38. See note 10 supra. 
39. The substantive validity of state fair housing laws seems well-established in a 
number of states. E.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 
P.2d 34 (1963) (holding invalid, .however, the part of the enforcement procedure _which 
delegated "carte blanche" authority to the commission to impose penalties or sanctions 
for the substantive por.tion of the statute in question); Vaught v. Village Creek Home-
owner's Ass'n, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 849 (Super. Ct. Fairfield County, Conn. 1962); 
Swanson v. Comm'n on Civil Rights, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 841 (Super. Ct. New Haven 
County, Conn. 1961); Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 
Mass. 387, 182 N.E.2d 595 (1962); David v. Vesta Co., 35 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 
(1965); Levitt &: Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 
177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1959); Cooney v. Katzen, 41 Misc. 2d 236, 245 
N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1963); New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham 
Hall Apartments, Inc., IO Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). It is inter-
esting to note that some of the above cases were cited with approval in the principal 
case. In O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 
P.2d I (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962), the court held invalid the prohibition 
against discrimination in publicly assisted housing. See Pearl &: Terner, Survey: Fair 
Housing Laws-Design for Equal Opportunity, 16 STAN. L. REv. 849, 852-79 (1964). 
A collection of cases upholding the constitutionality of state public accommodation 
statutes appears in Hearings, supra note 16, at 1381-83. For examples of state fair 
employment practices acts which have been upheld, see note 15 supra. For a com-
plete examination of state and local fair employment practices laws, see 2 EMERSON 
&: HABER, op. dt. supra note 9, at 1451-83. 
40. The substantive validity of local laws is rapidly becoming accepted. See Martin 
v. City of New York, 22 Misc. 2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Stanton Land Co. 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 111 P.L.J. 469 (Munic. Ct. Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, 1963). 
In District of Columbia v. Ruark, IO RACE REL. L." REP. 321 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., 
March 19, 1965), the court emphasized that there was no unconstitutional delegation of 
power to the commission. The enforcement procedure created by the ordinance (D.C. 
Pouo: REGULATIONS art. 45, § 8) was of the "conventional" type. Contra, Terry v. City' 
of Toledo, 270 Ohio 2d 251, 194 N.E.2d 877 (Lucas County Ct. App. 1963) (fair housing 
ordinance held invalid because it did not grant the Fair Housing Board enough power 
to make enforcement of the ordinance certain); see Pearl &: Temer, supra note 39, at 
892-93. See also Marshall ·v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962), upholding the 
constitutionality of a public accommodation ordinance with enforcement procedures 
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Another possible interpretation of the "conventional" ordinance 
would suggest that an aggrieved person's right of access to the city 
attorney is contingent upon the exhaustion of the administrative 
remedies established by the ordinance.41 However, few city attorneys 
would be inclined to proceed with a prosecution against the alleged 
violator in the face of a commission's dismissal of a complaint for 
lack of probable cause. Indeed, to do so might be disastrous politi-
cally. Thus, in practical application the result would echo that in 
Porter, since the commission's determination would be in effect 
adjudicatory. 
Under several other possible interpretations of "conventional" 
ordinances, it is possible to avoid the question whether criminal 
enforcement can be attached to administrative conciliation in a 
fashion that prevents a citizen from filing a criminal complaint 
unless such conciliation has failed. The possible interpretations are 
(I) that the aggrieved individual may file his complaint either with 
the city attorney or with the c;:ommission, the former choice not 
requiring an exhaustion of the latter remedy; (2) that the indi-
vidual's choice of procedure, as between the city attorney and the 
commission, is an irrevocable election; and (3) that an election to 
proceed through either the city attorney or the commission, but not 
the other, is an irrevocable choice. Under all these constructions, 
the result is that the aggrieved individual is not precluded from tak-
ing full advantage of the commission's powers. If the election to file 
a complaint with the commission is irrevocable, the persuasiveness 
of the conciliation process is augmented by the removal of any pres-
sure on a respondent that might prevent his agreeing in good faith 
to the terms of conciliation.42 If, on the other hand, the aggrieved 
party chooses to file a complaint with the city attorney, such an 
election still leaves open the way to informal investigation and con-
ciliation at the discretion of the solicitor, who may forward the 
(providing for criminal enforcement) almost identical to those in the "conventional" 
ordinance. 
In Stanton Land Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, supra, the court :rejected the argument 
that the Pittsburgh o:rdinance gave the Commission on Human Relations broad, un• 
defined, and nondelegable power to issue such orders as the facts warranted. The Court 
stated: "This argument is not too impressive. It seems to assume a finality to the orders 
of the commission which they do not have." Id. at 477. It is noteworthy that the Penn• 
sylvania Commission on Human Relations is empowered to issue enforceable orders, 
instead of merely :recommending prosecution, as in conventional ordinances. The fact 
that the ordinance in Stanton was upheld in its entirety would suggest that the Porter 
holding should be narrowly limited. Compare PITISBURGH, PA., ORDINANCE 523 (1958), 
. with OBERLIN, Omo, ORDINANCE 235 AC CMS (1961). 
41. But cf. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 
A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1959). For an analogous right arising under 
the National Labor Relations Act, see, e.g., Myers v • .Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 
303 U.S. 41 (1948). 
42. See note 36 supra. 
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matter to the commission. Therefore, in light of the language of
the "conventional" antidiscrimination law, it is apparent that even
if judicial power has been improperly delegated to the commission
in Porter, the court's holding should not be broadly applied to in-
validate other ordinances which treat the use of the commission as
permissive rather than mandatory.43
It seems clear that the framers of antidiscrimination legislation
have been of the opinion that conciliation is the best means of
bringing about voluntary compliance with the law, and that crimi-
nal sanctions should be employed only when the threat of their use
fails to encourage good-faith conciliation. Interpreting these statutes
as requiring that complaints be brought only to the city attorney
or the municipal court, as the court in the principal case implied,
would be self-defeating. While it would have the apparent effect of
reposing judicial power in the proper place, it would destroy the
intent of a municipality to vest discretionary powers in the com-
mission so that the adjudicatory process would often be unnecessary.
Thus, in order to implement the groundwork that has been
fashioned for the resolution of civil rights problems by adminis-
trative agencies, the Porter decision should be narrowly inter-
preted.44 It is regrettable that the court's vague language permits a
broad reading which poses problems that it is hoped the court did
not intend and implications that it surely could not have justified.
43. It is true that the judicial remedy which leaves the prosecutor free to prosecute
and also leaves, the commission in existence would still not limit the prosecutor's
freedom to delegate informally to the commission the investigation and conciliation
functions it formerly performed. However, it is suggested that the existence of the
commission as an available means of redress is vital to effective treatment of civil
rights problems simply in terms of the feelings of minority groups who respect the
commission and its objectives and fear having to initiate the filing of a complaint
with the prosecutor.
44. See notes 13, 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
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